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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the ethical permissibility of deceiving civilians during 
military operations, primarily military deception operations. It examines this issue using 
both consequential and non-consequential frameworks and explores how the potential 
ethics of deceiving civilians interacts with current just war theory, the doctrine of double 
effect, and non-combatant immunity. These common ethical frameworks are used to 
develop a method for evaluating the ethical considerations of deceiving civilians in war. 
This method is then applied to a case study involving deception of civilians in Syria. 
Weighing those considerations in a real-world scenario provides information on how 
these types of deceptions measure up morally both in theory and practice. Ultimately, a 
recommendation on the probable morality of any future deception of civilians is 
determined. 
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I. DECEIVING CIVILIANS AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE  
A. THE FALL OF TROY AND LIBERATION OF MANBIJ 
Troy was burned. The people surely cried to the gods in anguish for the Greeks, led 
by cunning Ulysses who had deceived them. This is not merely an old story, but one of the 
oldest stories. But more importantly, it is possibly the earliest story of military deception. 
And so, it is striking that in this Methuselah of deception tales that Ulysses relied not only 
on fooling the king of Troy, Trojan heroes, and soldiers, but also the common citizenry. 
With the threat of the Greek army believed to have evaporated, the citizens of Troy 
streamed out and marveled at the abandoned camp and the infamous horse which bore 
Ulysses and his commandos hidden in its timbers. It was to shepherds that the lying Sinon 
surrendered and to the people of Troy that he told his deceitful tale that helped convince 
them to bring the horse within the impenetrable walls of Troy.1 Military deception has 
comprised a core role in military strategy within multiple cultures throughout history. 
Western strategist Carl von Clausewitz states that “without [surprise] superiority at the 
decisive point is hardly conceivable.”2 Perhaps the most famous quote concerning the 
necessity of military deception comes from Sun Tzu. The very first chapter of The Art of 
War mentions that “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we can attack, we must 
seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must 
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we 
are near.”3 The treatises of these two timeless authors relate to defeating, and where 
possible deceiving, the enemy. Ulysses’ deception focused on the military of Troy, which 
the Greeks could not defeat on the field of battle otherwise but relied on fooling civilians 
to extract the desired enemy action of moving the horse within the city walls. 
                                                 
 1 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Robert Fagles (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1997), 132–133; The 
Virgil, Aeneid, Trans. Robert Fagles (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2010), 74–85.  
 2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 198.  
 3 Sun Tzu, Art of War, trans. Chow-Hou Wee (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003).  
2 
If the mythological account of the sacking of Troy were the only reference to using 
the deception of civilians as an aid to successfully deceiving the enemy then the following 
discussion might be purely academic. However, a potential case of just such a situation has 
arisen in America’s most recent conflict in the Middle East against the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). Due to the highly secretive nature of military deceptions, it may be 
decades before the Pentagon declassifies an official version so what is presented here 
remains unverified. However, the information gleaned through open sources paints a 
compelling picture of what was likely a modern-day military deception that included 
deliberately deceiving civilians as a core piece of the operation. What follows is not meant 
to be an exhaustive history or analysis of counter-ISIS operations in Syria during the 
summer of 2016. Instead, it will set the stage with the key pieces of information that could 
lead a reasonable observer to conclude that a deception operation had occurred. 
In the spring and summer of 2016, it appeared to outside observers that U.S. 
military forces and their Syrian partners began setting the stage to capture Raqqa, the 
capital of ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate. Below is a collection of known actions that the 
U.S. military or its partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), took that created the 
impression that an attack on Raqqa was imminent. These actions comprise what I believe 
to have been a deception operation. 
• U.S.-led coalition aircraft conducted airstrikes in and around Raqqa, 
apparently to demoralize ISIS fighters before the SDF assaulting the city.4 
• Thousands of SDF fighters moved south from staging areas to the front 
lines north of Raqqa.5 
                                                 
 4 Jamie Dettmer, “Raqqa Civilians Flee Airstrikes as Kurds, Jihadists Clash,” Voice of America, May 
25, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/raqqa-civilians-flee-airstrikes-kurds-jihadists-clash.  
 5 Liz Sly, “U.S.-Backed Offensive in Syria Targets Islamic State’s Capital,” The Washington Post, 
May 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ground-offensive-in-syria-seeks-to-
squeeze-islamic-state-stronghold-raqqa/2016/05/24/68035454-21b0-11e6-b944-52f7b1793dae_story.html.  
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• SDF forces then conducted a limited assault towards Raqqa, capturing 
about six kilometers of terrain along the front and clearing several villages 
of ISIS fighters.6 
• The SDF publicly stated that 31 different military units, including 19 
brigades would be taking part in the assault on Raqqa.7 
• SDF commander Rojda Felat wrote on Twitter that the goal of the new 
offensive was to “liberate northern Raqqa”.8 
• Dropped leaflets on Raqqa telling civilians to flee the city.9 (See Figure 1)  
 
                                                 
 6 Eyn Isa, “What Has Happened during the Operation Liberate North Raqqa?,” ANF News, May 26, 
2016, https://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/what-has-happened-during-the-operation-liberate-north-raqqa-
15025.  
 7 Isa, “What Has Happened during the Operation Liberate North Raqqa?” 
 8 “Syria Conflict: Kurds Launch Campaign North of IS-Held Raqqa,” BBC News, May 24, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36371226.  
 9 William M. Cotter, “Do Military Leaflets Save Lives or Just Instill Fear?,” SAPIENS, May 4, 2017, 
https://www.sapiens.org/language/military-leaflets-warfare-language/; Natasha Bertrand, “The US-Led 
Coalition Is Dropping These Leaflets on ISIS’ Capital in Syria to ‘Mess with Them’,” Business Insider, 
May 21, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/leaflets-isis-capital-raqqa-syria-2016-5; Hannah L. Smith, 
“Coalition Leaflet Drop Signals Raqqa Assault,” The Times, May 20, 2016, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/
article/coalition-leaflet-drop-signals-raqqa-assault-p933b0t3t; Andrew. Tilghman, “The U.S. Military Is 





Figure 1. In Arabic, this reads, “The time you have long awaited for has 
arrived. It’s time to leave Raqqa.”10  
This last action is the part of the suspected deception that concerns this study. The 
leaflet is speaking directly to the city’s civilian population, urging them to flee. This is 
exactly the type of message you would expect to see before an urban assault to minimize 
civilians on the battlefield (COB). While not every news site or blog at the time appears to 
have believed that the SDF was actually about to take Raqqa, these actions were certainly 
convincing to many. Charles Lister, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute asked “Is 
the much-vaunted YPG/SDF offensive on ISIS’ de facto capital of Raqqa approaching? 
Force deployments this morning suggest: Yes,” on Twitter.11 ISIS was also visibly 
reinforcing northern Raqqa for the coming assault.12 
What then makes all of this almost certainly a deception? Only a week after these 
displays and dropping the leaflets, on 31 May 2016 the SDF conducted a surprise attack to 
the west to liberate the city of Manbij, Syria. This operation involved U.S. airstrikes, the 
deployment of an Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB) across the Euphrates River, 
                                                 
 10 Bertrand, “ The US-Led Coalition Is Dropping These Leaflets on ISIS’ Capital in Syria to ‘Mess 
with Them’” 
 11 Hamoud Almousa, “Leaflets On Raqqa And Military Movements In Ein Essa.” Raqqa is Being 




and significant SDF manpower.13 Encircling the city in a matter of days and capturing it 
two months later cut ISIS off from its supply lines in Turkey, a major strategic victory.14 
On its own, this might only be an interesting bit of military history in the larger war 
against ISIS. However, what is unclear is the impact on the civilian population in Raqqa 
after the United States disseminated the deceitful leaflet. For while there were scatted 
reports of refugees leaving the city immediately following the dissemination, a more 
complete picture would not emerge until after the SDF liberated Raqqa.15 A RAND study 
suggests that while the population of Raqqa increased in 2015, by the late spring and early 
summer of 2016 there was a sharp decrease. By June, RAND contends that Raqqa’s 
population had decreased by more than 25% from its high the previous year.16 A REACH 
study reported a similar finding, that several hundred thousand refugees had fled Raqqa 
starting as early as April 2016, continuing a trend until Raqqa was liberated later that 
year.17  
None of these reports provide direct proof that the leaflet drop was causally 
responsible for the exodus of refugees from Raqqa at this point in the war. The timing and 
size of movements do indicate that the populace did believe such an attack was coming and 
is reasonable that the direct message telling them to leave was at least a contributing factor. 
Logically, if the citizens saw evidence of a coming assault without being directly targeted 
as a part of the U.S. deception it is reasonable for them to flee the coming battle. This 
creates a situation where a military deliberately deceiving civilians as a part of military 
deception is not merely plausible, but likely to have already occurred. Effects of that 
                                                 
 13 Zen Adra, “SDF Inch Closer to ISIS-Held Manbij.” AMN News, June 1, 2016. 
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/sdf-inch-closer-isis-held-manbij/. 
 14 Krishnadev Calamur, “What Happens When a Town Is Liberated From ISIS,” The Atlantic, August 
13, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/syria-manbij-liberated-from-isis/495779/. 
 15 Jamie Dettmer, “Raqqa Civilians Flee Airstrikes as Kurds, Jihadists Clash,” Voice of America, May 
25, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/raqqa-civilians-flee-airstrikes-kurds-jihadists-clash. 
 16 Eric, Robinson et al., When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic 
State Governance in Iraq and Syria, RR-1970-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1970.html. 
 17 REACH Initiative, Ar-Raqqa Crisis Overview: November 2016 - October 2017 - Syrian Arab 
Republic, (OCHA ReliefWeb, November 13, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/ar-
raqqa-crisis-overview-november-2016-october-2017.  
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deception could in theory be quantified, providing a working starting point to explore any 
ethical problems or considerations concerning deceiving civilians during war.  
B. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM 
A quick review of modern U.S. military doctrine concerning military deception is 
not particularly helpful in determining where civilians or other non-combatants fall during 
a military deception. JP 3-13.4 Military Deception only contains one reference to civilians 
or non-combatants when declaring that deceptions considered to be perfidy are illegal, due 
in part to the harm they may cause civilians.18 The U.S. Army’s FM 13-3.4 Military 
deception is not much better with the same mention as well containing the admonishment 
to ensure deceptions do not harm civil-military relationships.19 By doctrine, this leaves the 
idea of directly attempting to deceive civilians as a part of a larger military deception in a 
bit of a grey area. Furthermore, while deceiving civilians during a military deception aimed 
at defeating an enemy force seems like the most likely time when civilians would be 
targeted, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that other times and reasons might present 
themselves to military commanders. 
Illuminating whether militaries deceiving civilian populations during a war can be 
ethically justified can be determined by scrutinizing two existing areas of literature. By 
exploring existing thought on military ethics and lying, two apparent disjunctive syllogisms 
occur, that if affirmed would provide a reasonable basis for making an ethical 
determination: 
1. Either deceiving civilians violates one or more established principles of 
military ethics and is never justified, or if it may be justified, it must be 
consequentially proportionate to be justified. 
2. Either deceiving civilians constitutes lying and must be treated 
accordingly, it does not constitute lying but is morally equivalent, or it is 
neither lying nor morally equivalent.  
                                                 
 18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), 18. 
 19 Department of the Army, Military Deception, FM 3-13.4 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2019), https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1006341, 42, 47. 
7 
C. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The purpose of this study, then, is to: 
1. Utilize existing philosophical thoughts on military ethics and the ethics of 
lying and deception to determine parameters for evaluating the morality of 
deceiving civilians. 
2. Elucidate justifications for or against the deception of civilians during war 
following previously established parameters. 
3. Establish the limits within which the purported claims are reasonably 
justified. 
Chapter II provides a review of the pertinent existing literature. Due to there being 
very little current overlap between the literature on military ethics and the ethics of lying 
and deception each will receive a dedicated subchapter. Key topics include Just War 
Theory (JWT), the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), Non-Combatant Immunity (NCI), 
and the moral distinction between, if any, between lying and deception in general. 
Chapter III discusses the methodology of determining the parameters for evaluating 
the morality of deceiving civilians by utilizing some of the key elements brought forth 
during the literature review.  
Chapter IV evaluates the morality of deceiving civilians in war utilizing the 
aforementioned parameters. The chapter divides into sections for consequentialist 
arguments, non-consequentialist arguments, and key elements of existing JWT. Each 
section will address potential counterarguments for that section’s reasoning and 
conclusions. 
Chapter V coalesces the various arguments from the previous chapter and 
synthesizes a conclusion that included under what circumstances, if ever, targeting civilians 
for deception can be justified. Recommendations for further research are also presented.  
  
8 
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II. THE CURRENT LITERATURE ON MILITARY ETHICS 
AND LYING 
A. DIVIDING THE LITERATURE 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, no direct research on the ethics of deceiving civilians 
during war appears in the existing literature that could be found. One scholar, John Mattox, 
has written several pieces on the ethics of military deception. However, his research 
focused on the ethics of deceiving the enemy and not civilians caught up in the deception, 
which is the focus of this research. Without specific pre-existing scholarly thought on 
which to build, this work will review two different areas of scholarly thought that together 
provide a well-rounded foundation to draw from.  
The ethics of war and military usage are far-reaching, with a deep well of thought 
to draw from. For this research, it can be narrowed down significantly to focus on two 
areas. First, existing thoughts on the ethics of military deception in general will be 
explored. Next, the JWT as relating to non-combatants and civilians will be examined. 
Together these will provide the lens through which to view the broader topic of lies and 
deceptions in general in the second part of this chapter. It also provides important context 
for how scholars have previously reasoned other military ethical issues from the positions 
of different normative theories. 
Following the discussion on military ethics, this chapter makes a close investigation 
of the ethics of lying. This extends to what constitutes a lie, whether military deception is 
or is not a lie, the moral weight of lies, and can they be good or right. This is important as 
the morality of lying is possibly one of the oldest ethical topics, with recorded discussion 
going back to the ancient Greek philosophers. While the research topic involves the 
military as the deceiver, because the civilians potentially being deceived are not military 
personnel a less focused and more universal view on the nature of lying is required. This 
broader view is important to avoid military group think when developing a framework for 
answering this research question in further chapters by seeking ethical arguments 
concerning lying that may not otherwise be considered relevant from a military perspective.      
 
10 
B. MILITARY ETHICAL VIEWS 
When considering the ethics of deliberately deceiving civilians during war, as a part 
of a military deception operation ultimately designed to deceive an enemy decision-maker, 
it seems prudent to start with what has been written on the ethics of deception in war. 
However, since little writing on the ethics of military deception currently exists, a broader 
range of related topics must be examined before delving into the problem of deceiving 
civilians. To do this several topics concerning the idea of Non-Combatant Immunity (NCI) 
should be explored to determine how civilians should be treated during war in general and 
other related scenarios such as non-lethal weapons and Information Operations that provide 
a starting point to apply ethical thought to the primary question of this research. 
Is military deception lying? The idea that it is not might be counterintuitive but is 
exactly the argument Mattox makes, which has serious implications for any ethical 
discussion of military deception.20 This is especially true if deception operations are to be 
evaluated against a Kantian deontological approach under which all lies are harmful. While 
Mattox does not argue that all military deceptions are separate from lies (and therefore 
morally blameless), citing classic cases of perfidy as falling into the second category, he 
and Hempson-Jones appear to rely heavily on the military necessity of deception rather 
than its inherent morality.21 It is also important to note that these arguments are exclusively 
looking at the ethics of deceiving the enemy, without mention of civilian considerations. 
Mattox’s argument also seems to take too rigidly or too simplistically the idea that a 
Kantian view must hold that lies are never morally permissible; or it is too rigid, at any 
rate, for a more general non-consequentialist view. Kantian and other non-consequentialist 
views often do maintain that lying could still be the best overall choice as the ‘lesser evil’ 
among a range of choices, even while maintaining that it is still an evil. If the idea of Just 
War allows for activities such as killing that would otherwise be impermissible it leaves 
                                                 
 20 John M. Mattox, “The Moral Limits of Military Deception,” Journal of Military Ethics 1, no. 1 
(2002): 4–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/150275702753457389. 
 21 Justin S. Hempson-Jones, “The Ethics of Online Military Information Activities,” Journal of 
Military Ethics 17, no. 4 (February 2018): 211–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2019.1586357. 
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open for further examination the idea that lies would not necessarily be unjust or wholly 
impermissible, even if they are seen to be harmful by their usual nature. 
This raises a simple response that many seem to hold regarding the permissibility 
of deception in war. If JWT tells us that some people can be morally liable to be killed in 
war such that the killing is justified and permissible, given certain constraints and 
conditions, then surely a significantly lesser harm like lying could also be justified, under 
certain constraints and conditions. However, of course, under JWT civilians, in particular, 
are immune from killing in war and other harms. Does this protection extend to the ‘harm’ 
of lying, even in cases of necessity? Determining an acceptable answer requires further 
exploration of the existing ethical thought concerning what constitutes ethical treatment of 
civilians in war. 
Many scholars discuss the concept of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), which 
has existed since the beginning of Just War Theory and has commonly been expressed in 
four tenants, with some variation. Here it is included with common examples of each as 
presented by Kauffman.   
1. The action must not be wrong in itself. For example, the strategic bombing
of legitimate military targets in a just cause is not itself wrongful.
2. The agent must not intend the bad effects. Thus, the strategic bomber must
not intend to harm the civilians.
3. The bad effects must not be the means to the good effect. In strategic
bombing, the good effect is the destruction of legitimate military targets;
harm to civilians is a side effect but not the means by which the legitimate
military targets are destroyed.
4. The good sought must be proportionately important relative to the bad
effects that are foreseen. The destruction of the legitimate military targets
12 
must be a sufficiently weighty value to justify harm to civilians; a target of 
trivial value would not justify significant harm to civilians.22 
While the DDE is commonly accepted in this basic form it is not without 
controversy in several areas that scholars continue to debate. Part of this simply comes 
from the many theories of ethics that the DDE can be interpreted through as Jensen lays 
out, to include both the three common ethical theories of consequentialism, non-
consequentialism, and virtue theory. But could also include other less accepted models 
such as religious universalism.23 However, much of the debate is between whether the 
intent requirement of the third tenant or the utilitarian calculation of the fourth should have 
primacy. Proponents of the deontological approach focus on the intent to not harm 
civilians; unintended but foreseen harm to civilians is (potentially) morally justifiable 
according to the DDE, while the same amount of harm done intentionally would not be 
justifiable according to these ‘intent’ tenants. In this view, the fourth tenant of 
proportionality can be easily abused not because the underlying utilitarian calculation is 
wrong but because the humans making the calculation is prone to weigh their own needs 
higher than the “other” to include foreign civilians.24 Furthermore, a consequentialist 
reading would allow for the killing of some amount of civilians to save some larger number 
but Mayer points out that the immunity that noncombatants have from being intentionally 
harmed or targeted is possessed by each noncombatant.25 
The counterargument would say that relying on intentions would mean that since 
intentions are an interior act of the mind that a military planner could “direct their 
                                                 
 22 John M. Mattox, “The Ethics of Military Deception” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command & 
General Staff College, 1998), 100, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA350010; Whitley Kauffman, 
“What Is the Scope of Civilian Immunity in Wartime?,” Journal of Military Ethics 2, no. 3 (2003): 186–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570310000685. 
 23 Mark N. Jensen, “Hard Moral Choices in the Military.” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 4 (2013): 
341–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.869897. 
 24 Peter Olsthoorn, “Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics,” Journal of Military Ethics 10, 
no. 2 (2011): 81–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2011.593711; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
 25 Chris Mayer, “Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity: Is It Permissible to Target 
Noncombatants?,” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 3 (2007): 221–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/
15027570701539552. 
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intentions” in a suitable way for the action they wish to take and then the actual 
consequences would not matter because the intention was correct. Since under utilitarian 
theory all lives are equal regardless of the distance from the person making the calculation, 
a biased decision such as dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could not be 
honestly attributed to utilitarianism, as American lives were valued over Japanese 
civilians.26 Additionally, when specifically looking at military deception, Mattox 
unsurprisingly finds that a utilitarian approach seems to be more consistent to overcome 
objections to lying that deontology might raise.27  
Walzer goes beyond simply trying to determine which of the four tenants should 
have primacy and proposes a fifth tenant: that it is not enough to avoid civilian casualties 
as much as possible but that a soldier must do this while accepting costs to himself. Walzer 
calls this double intention in that first the intention must be to hit the intended target and 
not something else, with the second being to minimize the number of civilian casualties. If 
necessary, at risk to oneself.28 This potential addition would seem to be supported by 
Ficarrotta who pushes for the idea that strictly within a military context, military 
professionals can be held to a higher moral standard than others.29 Olsthoorn sees this as 
addressing the DDE’s weakness of leniency but thinks it still assigns the most importance 
to a sincere effort to avoid civilian casualties rather than addressing the actual 
consequences that civilians may suffer. To Olsthoorn, the question remains why in a 
military setting the intention should matter that much (author’s emphasis), believing that 
Walzer has not fully justified the reasoning.30 Ultimately, there seem two strong arguments 
for both the deontological and utilitarian aspects of the DDE, it appears likely that when 
applying the DDE to deceiving civilians that there will remain this tension that will need 
to be accounted for. 
                                                 
 26 Olsthoorn, “Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics”; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 155 
 27 Mattox, “The Ethics of Military Deception,” 100. 
 28 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 155. 
 29 Carl J. Ficarrotta, Kantian Thinking about Military Ethics (New York: Routledge 2016), 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315590899. 
 30 Olsthoorn, “Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics”; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a 
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.  
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While much of the literature offers an opportunity to see the various arguments for 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism playing out, the work of Mayer on NCI and 
non-lethal weapons may bear particular relevance to deception. Specifically, when 
considering Mattox’s argument that not all military deceptions are lies. Even if that is 
accepted as true for military targets, Mayer’s arguments on why non-lethal weapons cannot 
be ethically used against those protected by NCI offer reasons why a deception used against 
those same targets may also be unethical. His first argument is that using any weapon, even 
a non-lethal one, against civilians is treating them as combatants and thus causing harm as 
they are being targeted for military purposes even if the intent is to minimize civilian harm 
otherwise. Additionally, if a civilian has NCI, they have not consented to be a part of 
military action, so there is no military justification for targeting them. Mayer also posits 
that NCI not only prohibits causing physical harm to a noncombatant but prohibits treating 
them as if they have a military status or value. Another way to think of these positions 
might be to say that is not permissible to use civilians as a means to a military end even if 
the intent is to reduce civilian casualties or does not involve physical harm. Finally, he 
argues that using coercion or not allowing non-combatants to make their own choices is 
harmful in its own right, which is an argument that will require addressing directly.31 
Kaurin agrees with Mayer’s argument for why non-lethal capabilities are not 
inherently more ethical and provides clear simplified reasoning. She points out that while 
non-lethal weapons offer the potential to achieve better proportionality, they must not 
violate the Principle of Discrimination that establishes the difference between combatant 
and non-combatant.32 Regardless of the reduction in harm a non-lethal weapon does, by 
intentionally targeting non-combatants, violates this principle despite a good intention to 
do less harm.  
                                                 
 31 Mayer, “Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity,” 221–23. 
 32 Pauline M. Kaurin, The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes 
Asymmetrical (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 60–61. 
15 
C. ETHICS OF LYING AND DECEPTION   
Lying may be one of the oldest subjects in philosophy and ethics, with the debate 
ongoing. To start it will be important to determine a definition of what exactly constitutes 
a lie as not all deceptions may constitute a lie. If this is so, then it is also important to 
capture scholar’s arguments for whether there is a moral difference between lying and other 
types of deception such as misleading. Currently, there appear to be largely two camps, 
one that argues all lies are bad but that not all deceptions should be considered lies and thus 
may be permissible, and another that believes lies and other deceptions may be different 
by definition but are necessarily morally different. Within these two sides, there are other 
issues such as duty, virtue, mental reservation, and the importance of intent and 
consequences that require some level of exploration. Due to the focus of the core topic, 
accidental lies and arguments for or against lying based on religion are not included but 
this is not meant to signify their lack of worth to the greater philosophical discussion of 
lying.33  
1. Definition of Lying 
The definition of what constitutes a lie appears to be for the most part similar but 
with authors being more precise over time, drawing a greater distinction between lies and 
other forms of deception. Though some authors appear to take the definition of lying as 
common and knowledge and do not provide one, perhaps see lying like Supreme Court 
Justice Stewart viewed obscenity, you know it when you see it. For those that do provide 
some form of definition, below are a few definitions by different scholars in increasing 
complexity: 
• “An intentionally untruthful declaration to another man”34 
                                                 
 33 While this study is focused on deliberate deception of civilians there remains the possibility of 
unintentionally but perhaps foreseeably, deceiving civilians during war. While beyond the scope of this 
study, such unintentional deception could likely be analyzed for permissiveness through the existing 
Doctrine of Double Effect discussed in Chapter II. 
 34 Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy: The Complete Texts of Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, and Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals, with On a Supposed 
Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, Trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. 
Co., 1992), 64. 
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• “An intentionally deceptive message in the form of a statement” (emphasis 
by author)35 
• “A lie is a statement made by one who does not believe it with the 
intention that someone else shall be led to believe it”36 
By the third example we find three general parts, (1) a person makes a statement; 
(2) they believe it to be untrue; (3) they intend to make someone else believe it. 
Furthermore, multiple scholars make the point that regardless of whether they use the term 
statement, utterance, declaration, etc., that this includes any means of direct 
communication to include verbal, written, sign language, Morse code, or even smoke 
signals.37 Saul adds further precision to the definition in her work comparing the ethics of 
lying with misleading. She admits that there may be lies that exist outside this definition 
but that it strives to eliminate deceptions that are not lies. 
 Lying:  If the speaker is not the victim of linguistic error/malaprop- 
   ism or using metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, then they lie iff 
(1) they say that P; (2) they believe P to be false; (3) they 
take themselves to be in a warranting context. In order for 
an utterance to say that P, its audience must reasonably  
(emphasis by the author) take the speaker to mean that P.38 
This definition works to significantly constrain what is considered a lie, while 
notable not requiring that a P be false. It also requires that the speaker is in a warranting 
situation, whether formal such as under oath in a court or informal in day-to-day 
conversation, unless under a special circumstance such as joke-telling. It also removes the 
requirement that the speaker intends to deceive so that “bald-faced lies” are included. 
Removal of intent from lying pushes it back into the realm of deception in general so that 
                                                 
 35 Sissela Bok, Lying, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1999), 15. 
 36 Arnold Isenberg, “Deontology and the Ethics of Lying,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 24, no. 4 (June 1964): 463–80. 
 37 Bok, Lying, 13; Isenberg, “Deontology and the Ethics of Lying,” 466; Jennifer M. Saul, Lying, 
Misleading, and What Is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 3–19. 
 38 Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What Is Said, 19, 36.  
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a lie becomes merely a specific method for deception. It is important to note though that 
intent to deceive is different from intent for deceiving which this chapter covers later when 
discussing scholar’s thoughts on the moral difference between lying and misleading. 
2. Condemning Lies but Accepting Deceptions 
Immanuel Kant and St. Augustine are two philosophers who take possibly the 
strictest interpretation to condemning the morality of lying. For Augustine, the lie even 
included lies of omission or silence and other deceptive utterances. Even lying to save a 
life was not to be permitted.39 Kant, as seen in the examples given above was stricter in 
his definition of lying. However, he was just as absolute in his condemnation, stating that 
“For a lie always harms another; if not some other [specific human being], then it 
nevertheless does harm to humanity in general, in as much it violates the very source of 
right.”40 For Kant, if a person tells the theoretical murderer at the door that their target is 
not in the home then that person is completely blameless in every way if the murderer then 
finds and kills that target for they did the right thing and are not responsible for the 
murderer’s actions.41 To many people, this may seem extreme and while many other 
philosophers agree with the wrongness of lying, they take a more nuanced approach to 
what constitutes a lie and what deceptions might be permissible. 
The first concept that is used to permit deception without lying is the idea of 
equivocation or mental reservation. Woods uses the story of St. Athanasius to demonstrate 
his point that equivocation does not include the malice of a lie. In short, St. Athanasius was 
being pursued but when the guards sent to apprehend him came upon him on the road, they 
failed to recognize him, asking if he had seen Athanasius. He replied, “Oh yes, he is not 
far away. Make haste and you will catch him.” Woods posits that while Athanasius meant 
literally that he was standing before them, the mental reservation, that the guards might 
have discovered this if they had thought carefully. It is on the recipient of the statement to 
                                                 
 39 Remo Gramigna, “Augustine on Lying: A Theoretical Framework for the Study of Types of 
Falsehood.” Sign Systems Studies 41, no. 4 (December 17, 2013): 446–87, https://doi.org/10.12697/
sss.2013.41.4.05.  
 40 Kant, Ethical Philosophy, 64–65. 
 41 Peter Singer, ed., Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 280–281. 
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carefully interpret the message and as long as it is possible, even if not likely that the 
message can be correctly interpreted then there is no lie or moral failing.42 Pascal provides 
a similar escape from lying, for example, if swearing that you did not do a certain thing, 
even if you had done it as long as in your head you maintained that you were swearing you 
had done it at a specific place or time that would make the statement true. Additionally, he 
goes as far as to say that promises are not binding if you have no intention of keeping them 
when the promise is made (emphasis added).43 This would be on the very lenient side of 
what equivocation can do to avoid the moral impermissibility of lying. 
While Bok will be discussed further when examining the moral equivalency of lies 
and other deceptions, she does bring forth Grotius as an example of those scholars that 
argue for rights and duty being required before an untruth becomes a lie. She relates how 
Grotius believed that if an individual did not have a right to truthful information then there 
is no duty to provide the truth and to speak falsely would not be a lie in this case.44 
Returning to the example of the murderer at the door asking if their intended victim was 
inside, under this definition of lying it would not be a lie to tell them an untrue answer 
because a murderer has no right to that information. Mattox takes a different approach. He 
maintains the deontological prohibition on lies but separates other deceptions that may be 
permissible under certain circumstances, specifically war. While some deceptions that 
classify as lies would still be considered immoral under his model, during war there is an 
understanding that adversaries will attempt to deceive each other within limits. Figure 1 
represents how deception, the intent to deceive, and lies interact and how military deception 
can fall both within and without lying. 
This is a clear example of a theory where deceptions, even when done with 
intentionality are not necessarily morally impermissible if they are not strictly lying. 
                                                 
 42 Henry Woods, A First Book in Ethics (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1923), 134–135. 
 43 Singer, Ethics, 269–270. 
 44 Bok, Lying, 37. 
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Figure 2. The intersection of spheres that encompass lying, deception, 
intentionality, and military deception45 
Finally, one further philosopher who has yet a different reason for lies being 
unethical is Aristotle. Not only do lies potentially harm the person they are told to but they 
harm the liar. Zembaty breaks down the various factors that Aristotle uses throughout his 
discourses that touch on the topic. While Aristotle is often associated with the more inward-
focused field of Virtue Theory, he makes multiple arguments, internal and external as to 
why lies have an inherent negative weight. On a macro scale, they damage the trust needed 
for society while on the micro-scale they do injustice to the receivers of the lie that as 
rational agents lose agency when they act on deceptive information. Aristotle also believed 
that the person that lies can be harmed from their deception and demonstrates a likely lack 
of the qualities needed to act virtuously. While Aristotle discusses the possibility of a lie 
that does not harm, the list of hurdles such a lie would need to meet makes it exceedingly 
difficult to imagine practical applications that would find his approval.46        
                                                 
 45 Source: Mattox, “The Moral Limits of Military Deception,” 5. 
 46 Jane S. Zembaty, “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 
1993: 7–29), https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1993.0008.  
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3. Moral Equivalency of Lies and Deceptions  
The second major camp of philosophers generally concurs in maintaining a 
distinction between lies and other deceptions. However, that does not necessitate that they 
have different inherent moral weights. These scholars can cross the consequentialist/non-
consequentialist spectrum, using either normative theory or even both to determine the 
ethicality of a given lie. For some lies do carry an intrinsic negative moral weight but it is 
slight enough to overcome depending on the intent and/or consequences. 
Saul deliberately scrutinizes whether deception in the form of misleading is always 
preferable to lying. She does not find an acceptable defense to the assertion that misleading 
is always morally preferable to lying. However, she does believe that there are special 
circumstances when misleading is preferable and that the choice between the two can 
illuminate moral information about the agent:  
1. Whether an agent chooses to lie or merely mislead can make an important 
difference to the moral evaluations of an agent (author’s emphasis). 
2. In an adversarial context like a courtroom, misleading is morally better 
than lying. 
3. Where there is a prior agreement that misleading is to be preferred to 
lying, misleading is morally better than lying.47  
It is important to understand that (1) does not mean that an agent that lies is worse 
than one that misleads even if the deceptions are equivalent. Instead, either method of 
deceiving might weigh against the agent more depending on the circumstances. Returning 
to the murderer at the door problem, Saul states that if Kant is wrong and that deception to 
save an innocent life is permissible then there is no reason misleading the murderer is 
preferable to lying.48 Another argument she makes is that lies should not be judged morally 
differently from other actions. In the case of violence, Saul argues the reason for the 
violence is evaluated rather than the method used. Homicide for self-defense is morally 
                                                 
 47 Saul, “Lying, Misleading, and What is Said,” 99. 
 48 Saul, 73–76. 
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very different than murder and it should not matter if the agent uses a rock or an assault 
rifle. Therefore, if deception is moral or immoral it makes no difference whether done 
through a lie or misleading.49   
Bok also equates deceit with violence, acknowledging the harm it can do while 
maintaining the idea of self-defense and in the case of lies triviality.50 Unlike Saul, who 
weighs lies individually, Bok applies innate moral negativity to lies. She believes even lies 
that do not harm the recipient still harm the trust that is necessary for society. They spread 
through methods such as imitation, retaliation, or to forestall suspected deception and thus 
erode societal trust.51 Even with this initial presumption of moral negatives, through a 
consequentialist calculation, that value can be overcome making some lies ethical. Bok 
strongly cautions against bias in that calculation when done by the liar. While it is possible 
for the lying agent to be unbiased, she takes the rare stand and must be acknowledged if 
agents are to have any chance at overcoming it in the future.52 The importance of consent 
in lies is another factor she explores. The notion of the noble lie, one told by leaders or 
governments to the people to allow action without proper public scrutiny is the context 
where Bok finds the lack of consent particularly disturbing. Consent and the ability for 
supervision by the people that it allows is a vital part of the necessary societal trust. She 
gives the cascading lies from President Roosevelt to Johnson to Nixon as an example of 
this breakdown.53 
Isenberg also sees that lying can have an intrinsic moral negative weight but finds 
that it may be so slight as to be irrelevant. That ultimately lies must be evaluated 
individually for intent and consequences, with him putting more weight on the former.54 
Lies are not intrinsically better or worse than any other lie. A lie can be morally worse 
depending on the specific subject matter, motive, and consequences but with these details 
                                                 
 49 Saul, 85. 
 50 Bok, Lying, 18. 
 51 Bok, 26. 
 52 Bok, 50–51. 
 53 Bok, 166–174, 179–180. 
 54 Isenberg, “Deontology of Ethics and Lying,” 479–480. 
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stripped out, any intrinsic wrongness must equal the value of the least serious lie. However, 
because there is no such thing as a “bare” lie, Isenberg does not believe that this argument 
can be proven even if true. Every lie is “told to a certain person about a certain thing from 
motives with such and such probable results.”55 Because of this, each lie must be evaluated 
separately. While he agrees with utilitarian thought that “lying can be good as a means, 
therefore right, and perhaps a duty if the actual or probable consequences are good ones.”56 
However, he points out the epistemic problem that “actions of any kind are apt to have 
boundlessly variable consequences” and the problem that causes for trying to justify a lie 
purely from its projected consequences, no matter how probable.57 
Finally, Bell and Whaley are not philosophers but experts in military affairs, 
deception, and intelligence. They offer a different type of scholarly approach, based on a 
realist view that lies and deception are a part of human nature and experience and hold no 
moral weight. They see deception as merely an advantageous distortion of the target’s 
perceived reality.58 Taking perhaps a cynical view, they posit that everyone gets cheated 
sometimes and that life is not fair, therefore you should expect it and lie when 
advantageous.59 They also do not see a difference in types of deception, even stating that 
“truth is the safest lie,” meaning that misleading by telling the truth so that the listener 
believes it to be untrue is the best deception.60       
                                                 
 55 Isenberg, 470–471 
 56 Isenberg, 478. 
 57 Isenberg, 475. 
 58 J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, Cheating and Deception (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), 47. 
 59 Bell and Whaley, 328–331.  
 60 Bell and Whaley, 60. 
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III. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
DECEPTION 
Having developed a sense of the relevant literature on ethical thought concerning 
war and lying it is time to develop a method of evaluation. This will allow for a systematic 
approach to determining the ethical considerations of deceiving civilians during war. The 
two examples given in Chapter I, Troy and Syria, deal specifically with deceiving civilians 
as a part of a larger military deception. There is no reason for this research to avoid looking 
at the morality of deceiving civilians during war in other situations. While there are 
possibly limitless potential situations where such a deception could happen—certainly too 
many to be judged individually—it is reasonable to at least explore the general concept. 
This may be critical to determining if specific examples are in line with existing JWT.  
First, it is important to determine the inherent morality of lies and whether they are 
intrinsically worse than other deceptions such as deliberate misleading info/data, 
misdirection, etc. From the literature review, there appear to be four possibilities. 
1. Lies are always unjustifiably bad but deceptions not involving actual lies 
may be morally justifiable. This is a classical deontological position and 
has a lot of supporters but is not without issues.61 
2. Lies are inherently good. While there does not appear to be anyone 
arguing for this position it is the logical reverse of position one, but can be 
discarded as indefensible as there are lies and deceptions that can be found 
to be bad and wrong based on the intent and consequences. 
3. Lies are inherently neutral and must be judged individually and cannot be 
justified or condemned without context. Due to this, lies are not better or 
worse than other forms of deception by their nature.62 
                                                 
 61 Kant, Ethical Philosophy, 64–65; Woods, A First Book in Ethics, 134–135. 
 62 Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, 46–47, 99. 
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4. Lies and other deceptions are equivalent and have a slight inherent 
negative moral weight due to the damage done to trust all other things 
being equal.63 
While the first possibility is popular with Mattox, who utilizes this line of reasoning 
in his defense of the morality of military deception in general, Saul effectively 
demonstrates why this is problematic.64 Combined with Isenberg’s arguments for lies 
having a slightly negative moral starting balance and option four seems to be the most 
promising. This gives a starting point: 
Ignoring all other factors, deceiving civilians in war, regardless of whether 
through lies or other means, has an inherently negative moral weight that 
must be justified through weighing intent, consequences, and compliance 
with other JWT criteria.  
In other words, it is morally preferable to not use deception over actions that do use 
deception, all other things being equal. That is if a given act X uses deception, and another 
act Y does not employ deception, but the actions have the same exact outcomes, it is 
morally preferable to pursue act Y over X. With this foundation, how to evaluate the 
designated types of deceptions against the JWT norms of the DDE and NCI are the next 
step in developing a framework. 
A. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
Chapter I discussed deceptions targeting civilians that were a part of a larger 
deception meant to ultimately fool an enemy military commander. These examples fit well 
within the existing usage of the DDE. However, as mentioned earlier there are possible 
situations where the deception of civilians is less closely tied to a military objective. 
Assuming these deceptions are still meant to in some way benefit a military campaign or 
objective, it makes sense to still measure them against the DDE. Primarily, the third and 
fourth tenants will be utilized for this scrutiny.  
                                                 
 63 Isenberg, “Deontology of Ethics and Lying,” 479–480. 
 64 Mattox, “The Moral Limits of Military Deception,” 4–15; Saul, “Lying, Misleading, and What is 
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Lies have been determined to have a default minor negative aspect so if there was 
no aspect of the lie that was redeeming the first tenant would certainly apply. Scrutinizing 
deceptions and lies based upon intent and consequences will be explored further below. 
Similarly, while there will likely be some theoretical examples that egregiously violate the 
second tenant of the DDE, determining whether the agent intended any harm from a 
deception would appear to be relatively clear cut. This is assuming that the actual intention 
is perfectly known as it is possible, even likely that a publicly stated intention would itself 
contain deception. Therefore, when looking at possible examples, the true intention will be 
explored as best as possible. For future analysis of real-world examples, determining the 
true intent may be difficult to ever know perfectly. 
The third principle of the DDE, stating that the bad effects cannot be the means to 
the good effects will require closer scrutiny when applied to deceive civilians. If deceptions 
are inherently at a starting negative, then without redeeming factors that can be viewed as 
automatically violating this tenant. What really must be reconciled though, is that this 
principle is normally applied when an attack on a military target will cause collateral 
civilian damage. In the quintessential bombing of an enemy factory, it is the destruction of 
the factory that must be the means to victory, not the deaths of any civilian workers or other 
collateral damage. When applied to target civilians for deception, there appear to be several 
possible interpretations. Specifically, it is the harm to civilians as the means to an end that 
violates the third tenant, not the fact that harm is done or that civilians were involved. 
Therefore, if the lie or deception to a civilian is the means to achieving the military ends 
and involved deliberate harm that is integral to being effective, then such a deception would 
violate this tenant.  
The fourth, and final tenant of the DDE deal with the proportionality of the action. 
The hardest part of determining if the harm is proportional to the gain will be minimizing 
the bias in the justification. It is unlikely to be fully eliminated, but if bias can be accounted 
for then there is a better chance to make an honest assessment of the positive and negative 
consequences of deception. Chapter II mentioned the scholarly debate about whether the 
third or fourth tenant should have primacy. However, this research project is treating them 
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equally in an attempt to stay true to the classic reading of the DDE, therefore no amount of 
good consequences can make up for a deception that violates any of the previous tenants.  
After identifying how each tenant interacts with the DDE, Kauffman’s version can 
be reworded to be more specific to deceiving civilians.65 
1. The deception must overcome its innate negative moral weight through 
intended or actual consequences. 
2. The purpose of the deception must not be to harm civilians. 
3. Deliberate harm to civilians through deception cannot be the means of 
achieving a military end. 
4. Any foreseen but unintended harm caused by the deception must be 
proportional to the good achieved. 
When judging a deception targeting civilians, if the deception does not violate any 
of these four tenants, then the deception may be ethically sound. However, further analysis 
is necessary to ensure other accepted moral principles are also respected.     
B. APPLYING NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY 
NCI interacts with the idea of deception in several ways. Looking back to Mayer’s 
arguments they can be broken down into three parts.66 Similar to the tenants of the DDE, 
this allows for multiple evaluations that are less complex than trying to determine whether 
NCI has been violated all at once.   
1. Using weapons on civilians, even non-lethal ones treat them as military 
targets. 
2. Civilians with NCI have not consented to be targeted during a conflict 
therefore have no military value. 
3. Coercive weapons or not allowing civilians to make their own choices is 
harmful. 
                                                 
 65 Kauffman, “What Is the Scope of Civilian Immunity in Wartime?,” 189–194. 
 66 Mayer, “Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity” 
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The first part would be a strict prohibition if deception is considered a weapon. 
Under U.S. Army doctrine, MILDEC is an Information Related Capability (IRC), falling 
under Information Operations (IO).67 Civilian populaces are an integral part of the 
Information Environment (IE), with other IRCs such as Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP), Public Affairs, and Civil Affairs targeting civilians through their activities with 
on occasion or almost exclusively depending on the IRC. This supports the supposition that 
IO, regardless of the IRC, is not a weapon but a capability. If this is the case, then deceiving 
civilians would not immediately violate the first principle. However, as it has been 
established that lies and deceptions can cause harm this does not provide an automatic pass 
as it is foreseeable that deception could be used against civilians in a way that is 
weaponized.  
 The second principle also has issues when trying to apply it to activities in the IE. 
For example, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), conducted by PSYOP 
forces, specifically exists to influence foreign target audiences, and change their behavior. 
This includes civilian populations as well as militaries.68 Perhaps, then the second 
principle only applies to targeting civilians in ways that deliberately cause harm. It does 
not make sense that there can be no interaction between militaries and civilians on the 
battlefield. A large part of the professed strategy in the recent counterinsurgency wars in 
the Middle East has involved the concept of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local 
populaces so civilians must have a form of military value that allows them to be targeted 
within the IE without violating the NCI. Part of this may be because unlike other types of 
non-lethal weapons, information has to be interacted with, at least cognitively, by the target 
audience. If the information is presented so that this cognitive interaction is done 
consciously then it allows the target audience, the choice of whether to accept the 
information and whether to interact with it. In this way, when a military introduces 
information into the IE, civilians then retain the choice of whether they want to act on it. 
For example, if a military provides truthful information about an upcoming strike to warn 
                                                 
 67 Department of the Army, The Conduct of Information Operations, ATP 3-13.1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, October 2018), 38–39. 
 68 Department of the Army, Military Information Support Operations, FM 3-53 (Washington, DC: 
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civilians it is the civilians’ choice to flee or not. Deceptive information may be different 
though because it deliberately provides false or misleading information that changes the 
audience’s ability to interact with it in the same way. Presenting deceptive information 
places the audience in a position where any choice they make based on that information is 
tainted because it is probable that they would not have made the same decisions if they had 
known the information was false. When looking at a specific example, this may be one of 
the most difficult ethical hurdles to overcome when justifying deception towards civilians 
vs other types of IO. A key aspect of making such a determination will rest on the intended 
reaction to the deception. If harmful to the civilian audience then using deception or other 
persuasive means that interfere with the receiver’s normal ability to make decisions would 
prevent them from consenting to any actions taken directly because of the disinformation. 
In effect, disinformation used in this way would be considered coercion as force, in the 
means of deception, is being applied to make civilians act against their own best interest. 
This is a more nuanced approach than what the U.S. army currently takes. 
According to the U.S. Army’s FM 3-53, military deception does not qualify as coercion or 
thought reform as force is not applied.69 Mayer discusses examples such as sleep gas or 
other weapons that target indiscriminately and may reduce civilian casualties but still cause 
harm. These types of weapons may have better consequences but for Mayer, NCI is an 
absolute.70 Still, such a strict interpretation would also potentially preclude many of the 
non-harmful forms of IO previously mentioned. As this paper is meant to not adopt a purely 
consequentialist or non-consequentialist approach, but instead strive to find a logical 
ethical balance that is useful to military commanders, a more nuanced ethical evaluation is 
required. Since it seems reasonable that IO, to include deception, can be conducted 
ethically, simply targeting civilians with an IRC such as deception would not necessitate 
violating NCI. With this view, deception may not inherently violate the third principle. 
Saul and Bok both equated deception with violence but both accept that violence or force, 
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in general, is not always unethical.71 Additionally, while deception may stack the deck, it 
does not apply force in the same way that even a non-lethal weapon does, but instead 
applies pressure to make certain beliefs or behaviors more likely. This is not to say that 
there is not potentially a larger moral cost to deception. The specific goal of the deception 
is likely important here. If the intent is to create thousands of refugees to interfere with an 
adversary’s military operations, then that would be a definite violation. But, if the goal 
were to simply get civilians to talk about a piece of deceptive information on social media 
with the hope that the adversary’s intelligence would pick up on it, then it becomes less 
clearly a violation.  
Overall, when trying to determine how to evaluate the deception of civilians against 
the principle of NCI, it appears to be walking the edge of what might be ethical. To aid this 
evaluation in the next chapter, here is another rewording to fit the NCI more to IO in general 
and particularly deception. 
1. Using weapons against civilians is prohibited but IRCs such as deception 
are not inherently weapons. 
2. Civilians have a different type of value than military targets that requires 
discrimination between the two. Only IO intended to be non-harmful can 
be targeted towards civilians. 
3. Deception cannot coerce civilians into action and cannot seek to persuade 
civilians to take any action that would be harmful to themselves.  
With both the principle of NCI and the DDE, some elements placed importance on 
intent and consequences. Because of this, the answer to whether deceiving civilians 
violates either one or is ethical at all requires examination of these variables. 
C. WEIGHING INTENT AND CONSEQUENCES 
The intent was a factor that appeared both within the DDE and NCI. When looking 
at how to weigh the intent of deception, two immediately appear as affecting its ethical 
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weight. First, deception requires a purpose. Second is the intended outcomes, including 
intended and foreseen benefits and/or harm to any parties involved. For consequences, it is 
not simply a tabulation to see if the deception did greater good than harm, in a utilitarian 
style. The possible and probable outcomes for both should be identified before the 
operation and then the outcome captured. 
When looking at the intent, the reason should capture the need for deception in the 
first place. Just like any military objective, the means used must intend to accomplish the 
necessary ends with the least harm done. When considering deceiving civilians, there is 
already a need to justify any starting harm caused by the deception itself. Therefore, the 
intent must be to achieve a good that requires both deception while also not using the 
civilians as a mere means to a military end. If the intent is not to ultimately bring good to 
the civilians being deceived, it is likely the deception cannot be justified. This includes the 
intended consequences, as while the true outcome is impossible to know before the 
deception, the intended outcome should be beneficial not just to the actor but to the 
deceived as well. 
When evaluating the consequences of deceiving civilians many factors will need to 
be captured. As Bok cautioned, while doing this it will be critical to be aware of any bias 
towards the side doing the deception. A deceiver has a natural tendency to be biased 
towards the justification or their lies and deceptions and to unfairly discount the value of 
others.72 Regardless, this will still be a subjective comparison as the good consequence of 
deception might be to save many combatant lives at the cost of hurting many civilians over 
a longer period. Additionally, deceptions might cause long term effects that are less likely 
to be identified and quantified and thus provide less data for case study analysis in a 
scholastic setting or training vignettes in a military classroom setting. For this paper, the 
example from Syria will provide a starting point, with which a range of possible 
consequences can be explored. Since it is not possible to know every potential consequence 
of even a simple lie, it is not expected that all possibilities will be discussed but instead, 
themes will be explored through specific examples. Ultimately what is sought is whether 
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the harm to civilians is proportional to the good and does not violate any portion of the 
previous JWT norms that focus on consequences such as proportionality. 
Between intent and consequences, several questions would appear to be important 
in determining the morality of wartime deception of civilians. The order they are presented 
in is what seems to be a logical one for narrowing in on ethical issues but is not otherwise 
in a particular rank order.  
• Is the deception necessary or could another method produce the same 
outcome? If the mission can be accomplished without deceiving civilians 
it should be unless there is a justifiable reason for why deception causes 
the least amount of harm. 
• Does the deception treat civilians as having a military value in a traditional 
sense or rely on force or coercion? 
• Is the intent to harm civilians? Deliberately seeking to harm civilians 
would immediately make the deception unethical. 
• Is any unintended harm proportionate to the likely good achieved?  
• Is the desired outcome probable or even possible? Determine if an 
intended good outcome for the civilians is achievable, and have reasonable 
factors been considered to account for possible long-term harm from the 
deception. 
These questions combine the reformed versions of the DDE and NCI to provide the 
framework for analyzing the ethical considerations of deceiving civilians in the next 
chapter. This framework provides a method but again, in seeking a common middle ground 
between major normative theories, a purest of either will find fault with it. However, this 
provides a reasonable way to analyze the ethical considerations utilizing both 
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IV. EVALUATING DECEIVING CIVILIANS 
Now that a method for applying normative standards such as the DDE and NCI to 
the deception of civilians in war exists, it is time to determine whether such deceptions are, 
or can be justified. For this evaluation, the Syria case study introduced in Chapter I can 
provide a real-world foundation. However, while this case study allows for a more 
substantive look at the potential consequences, intent, and other components of normative 
theories it is important to remember that the potential consequences and intent behind an 
action are theoretically infinite. Syria does provide an example where the various ethical 
factors can be reasonably evaluated and represent a type of deception towards civilians that 
would have a high likelihood of being repeated in other conflicts.  
  For this chapter, the likely potential consequences of the Syrian deception will be 
contemplated first, considering both the positives and negatives. Then the possible intents 
will be explored, focusing particularly on the aspect of harm because that will be important 
for the next section involving the DDE and NCI. Following these independent evaluations, 
the application of the reworked DDE and NCI considerations from Chapter III provides a 
rounded evaluation without focusing only on the consequentialist or non-consequentialist 
factors. While this case study will involve factors different from other theoretical 
deceptions, the purpose is to evaluate how ethical norms interact with deceiving civilians, 
not pass judgment on this one military operation. This approach allows for the possibility 
of reaching a greater understanding of the ethical considerations likely to support or 
condemn the idea of deceiving civilians in war more broadly. 
A. CONSEQUENCES: MEASURING THE ENDS  
 When inspecting the Syrian deception there appear to be four categories of 
consequences that require an accounting. The first is the general consequence of degrading 
trust by the civilian population towards the deceiving military when the deception becomes 
known. This includes both the population deceived and the greater civilian audience that 
becomes aware of the deception. The second is the effects on the population of Raqqa that 
was deceived. While there are not solid quantitative numbers on how many people fled the 
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city due to the deception, it is probable, even likely that of the known population that left 
at least some would fall into this category. The third is the effects on the population of 
Manbij, the city that was the true target of the SDF and U.S. attack. Fourth, there are effects 
on the military personnel conducting the deception. While there is a danger of the actor 
overemphasizing positive consequences for themselves and conversely for the deceived to 
be biased towards themselves, this study will endeavor to measure them from a neutral 
point of view. With all of these possible consequences, no matter how likely they would 
occur, it remains epistemically impossible to know for sure what the actual consequences 
will be for any given action.  
1. General Effects 
Bok attached a general erosion of societal trust to lying, even if the act could 
overcome that innate negativity.73 While societal trust might be an amorphous ideal, 
difficult to quantify, the Syria example provides a couple of specific ways it can apply and 
thus needs to be accounted for. While it is foreseeable that deception against civilians could 
be undetected and therefore unknown to the deceived, many military deceptions in general 
and the Syria example in particular only remain undiscovered until the true target is 
attacked. Once that happens it is reasonable to expect that both the adversary and any 
civilians deceived will know that the actor was lying. Once that happens several 
consequences are reasonably likely to occur. 
Any civilians that believed the false information, as well as potentially civilians not 
involved in the deception, that later learn of the deception are likely to have a negative 
reaction. While it is normal for an individual to be angry at having been lied to, Bok 
specifically warns about the potential harm of a government lying to a populace.74 For the 
moment assuming that no other harm was done to the civilians deceived other than the lie 
itself, and assuming the military operation was successful so that interaction between the 
military and the populace will continue, there are several possible consequences to account 
for.  
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With the degradation of trust between the military and the populace, any future IO 
efforts may not be as effective as they otherwise would be regardless of how honest or 
noble the messages are. But beyond that, a populace that feels that their trust has been 
betrayed may not be as willing to participate in other efforts such as post-conflict 
reconstruction, political realignment, or counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. This is 
particularly true in conflicts where the military has openly declared that it is attempting to 
win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace. Some amount could even join or provide direct 
aid to insurgent forces though this is likely to be a very small subset of the overall 
population if the one act of deception is the only contributing factor. Beyond the exact 
truth, rumors, and gossip about the deception can grow and twist the reality for the populace 
that creates further detrimental mindsets that could lead to action against the deceiving 
force. Regardless, these possibilities demonstrate that there are significant possible 
responses by the civilian population that could have long-ranging effects on friendly 
operations. The Syria scenario certainly provides for this type of scenario where the entire 
enemy government, in the form of ISIS, is being removed from the city and the support of 
the population would be beneficial if not required for successfully standing up a new one. 
Because of these potential consequences, the idea that there is an inherent negative moral 
weight to deception due to damaged trust should be coupled with the knowledge that there 
may be serious real-world consequences even if there is no other harm other than the 
deception itself. 
2. Raqqa Civilians 
The citizens of Raqqa were the direct target of the deception and face a range of 
potential consequences from that deception, both physical and immaterial. While none of 
the possible consequences here have direct causation for the Syria example, they do 
provide an understanding of what is likely and provides at least some way to potentially 
quantify these consequences in the future. When civilians are told to flee their city before 
an expected attack by a military force that until that point they would have seen as a 
credible, even if unliked, source of information it is logical to assume that many would 
heed the warning and flee. Therefore, this section looks primarily into the consequences of 
becoming a displaced person, and in particular a refugee. However, this will not be an 
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exhaustive study of life as a refugee and simply seeks to provide a set of effects that are 
common enough to apply generically to refugees and still have existing data to impact the 
consequentialist calculus portion of the overall analysis being done. 
The Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs at Brown University found 
has cataloged numerous hardships that refugees face. Regardless of whether displaced 
internally within their home country or externally as refugees, displaced persons often 
struggle to live in inadequate circumstances. This can include but is not limited to a “lack 
of access to food, health care, housing, employment, and clean water and sanitation, as well 
as loss of community and homes [with] refugees also [facing] difficulties in renewing visas, 
the denial of civil rights and services, the fear of deportation, and anxiety about the 
future.”75 Looking at the mental trauma caused by being a refugee, the Refugee Health 
Technical Assistance Center reports that: 
common mental health diagnoses associated with refugee populations 
include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depression, 
generalized anxiety, panic attacks, adjustment disorder, and somatization. 
The incidence of diagnoses varies with different populations and their 
experiences. Different studies have shown rates of PTSD and major 
depression in settled refugees to range from 10–40% and 5–15%, 
respectively. Children and adolescents often have higher levels with various 
investigations revealing rates of PTSD from 50–90% and major depression 
from 6–40%.76     
If these negative factors were not already difficult enough to compare against any potential 
positive consequences quantitatively, children of refugees often inherit that status, so that 
these issues become generational.77  
 While many people worldwide might face these issues, it seems difficult to justify 
tricking potentially tens of thousands of individuals into fleeing a city that will not truly be 
attacked. While the potential positive consequences are still to be explored, it may be 
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difficult to overcome the level of harm this deception could cause. As using surprise to 
minimize casualties will likely be the best defense to balance this harm it is important to 
recognize that every year thousands of migrating refugees die trying to reach safety.  
 
Figure 3. Migrants deaths 2014–2020 by region.78 
These consequences represent a significant range from the loss of home and community to 
death, so any potential benefits, not just to the military perpetrating the deception but to 
the civilians deceived must be equally great if there is to be any chance of justifying it.  
3. Manbij Civilians 
While the most apparent group of civilians that needed to be accounted for was the 
population in Raqqa, the civilians in Manbij are also affected by the Syria deception. In 
effect, it is the opposite situation from the Raqqa populace. Whereas in Raqqa, civilians 
may have needlessly fled a city before a non-existent attack, in Manbij the populace was 
not given the opportunity to flee before the real assault. While becoming a refugee is a life-
changing and potentially deadly situation to be in, civilians trapped in a city under siege 
can face even more significant risks. 
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Specifically, looking at urban conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that armed conflicts within urban areas were 
eight times more deadly for civilians than battles in other areas.79 Considering that while 
the surprise attack on Manbij successfully surrounded the city in a matter of days, it took 
two months of intense fighting to capture the city.80 While not broken out in their findings, 
it is reasonable to assume civilian deaths during urban combat are caused by a combination 
of direct exposure to combat and secondary effects of being in a city under siege such as 
starvation and disease.  
In this situation, by not providing advanced warning, the civilians are forced into a 
situation they might have otherwise avoided by fleeing. If some decided to remain, it would 
have been their choice, which does not remove their NCI protections, but would be 
supported by the principle of not taking away a non-combatant’s free will. Adding the 
suffering and death faced by the unaware citizens of Manbij to what the previous section 
already described for Raqqa further complicates the ability to balance the consequences of 
such a deception.  
4. Effects on Friendly Forces 
Deception to achieve surprise is ultimately about defeating an enemy with the least 
amount of life possible for friendly forces. Towards this purpose, surprise achieved through 
deception can change the odds significantly towards the attacker, and according to Gerwehr 
and Glenn, change the ratio of the enemy to friendly casualties from 1:1 to 5:1.81 With a 
reduced number of casualties, it is logical to expect that there are decreased other costs 
logistically that make deception a valuable investment for a military force. With urban 
combat being particularly dangerous for attackers, comprised of vertical spaced, 
subterranean features and canalizing canyons, understandably, an assaulting force would 
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desire an edge over a defending opponent.82 Gerwehr and Glenn posit that because of this 
complexity that deception is particularly potent in urban areas where there is a large amount 
of what they term “background noise” within the IE.83 However, when balanced against 
the potential harm done to the civilians in both Raqqa and Manbij, there does not appear to 
be a benefit of sufficient level to justify the deception consequentially. However, the final 
section of this chapter will more closely examine this when introducing the DDE and NCI 
to the evaluation.    
B. INTENT: ASSESSING THE MEANS 
Determining the intent for the overall deception in Syria is not difficult. While 
lacking confirmation without access to planning documents or from the military planners 
involved, it is still highly likely that the SDF and U.S. military were attempting to fool ISIS 
about the direction of the impending attack to prevent Manbij from being reinforced. 
However, what is of concern when determining if the portion of the deception targeting 
civilians was ethical. Indirectly, ISIS is by any objective measure an organization that is 
unethical in its actions, bringing large amounts of pain and suffering to the people under 
their rule.  
When looking at the declared reasons for fighting ISIS, both the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense so explicitly mention rescuing the civilian populations 
that lived under ISIS rule.84 So, at least some measure of the desired end did include 
improving the lives of the civilian populace, including those living in Raqqa and Manbij. 
Therefore, deceiving the civilians may not have been entirely a case of using them as a 
mere means to an end. However, much as the idea of destroying a city to save it seems self-
contradictory, the idea that any amount of harm brought upon civilians or their use as mere 
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means in specific operations, simply because there exists a strategic level goal of saving 
them does not seem to make sense or be justifiable. The operation to seize Manbij from 
ISIS was primarily about cutting off ISIS’s supply lines from Turkey and not to free any 
civilians forced to live under ISIS rule.85 And as Oliver notes, governments sometimes 
discuss liberating civilians, especially women, living under their adversary’s control even 
if the reason for war had nothing to do with those civilians to portray the conflict as having 
additional moral justifications.86 Therefore, other motives should be scrutinized before 
taking any declarations of good intent at their word.  
When looking at the Syria deception, the intent behind deceiving civilians was 
likely meant to add an additional aspect of realism to the overall deception targeting ISIS 
military leaders. Realism is a vital aspect of any military deception and is a function of the 
adversary’s intelligence apparatus and the amount of time needed to analyze friendly 
deceptive actions.87 Before a major urban assault, it is reasonable to expect the U.S. 
military to attempt to take some measures to mitigate civilian casualties, with some 
component of that existing in the IE. It is then understandable to expect ISIS to monitor 
U.S. and SDF activities in the IE to look for such signatures. Furthermore, if the civilian 
populace is acting in ways that indicate they believe the attack is coming it reinforces the 
enemy’s belief in that same direction. This places civilians as a conduit for a piece of the 
deception, with their interactions with the deception aiding in transmitting that belief in a 
false reality. There remains a large hole in the plan to use civilians as a part of the deception, 
and that is whether it was truly necessary to include, and thereby directly target for 
deception, civilians at all. Chapter I listed numerous ways the SDF and U.S. military sought 
to build the deception, but would the deception have been significantly more likely to fail 
if the civilians were not deceived? This is an empirical question. While impossible to know 
for sure, it seems unlikely that deceiving the civilians of Raqqa was critical to success. This 
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creates a large ethical problem as any harm caused would be unjustifiable. Removing the 
civilian portion of the operation would not make a difference to the civilians in Manbij but 
without deceiving the populace of Raqqa, any harm caused is easier to justify as foreseen 
but unintended, if civilians are not being directly targeted for deception.  
 While understandable, if deceiving civilians in this case study was unnecessary, 
then it is unlikely that it was undertaken with good moral intent. To make a final 
determination though, the next section will take what was learned in both the 
consequentialist section and this section and apply that information to the revised versions 
of the DDE and NCI. This should allow for a holistic view, ensuring all relevant aspects 
have been considered.  
C. APPLYING THE DDE AND NCI 
In Chapter III, both the DDE and NCI were reworked to be specific to deceiving 
civilians. These versions will not provide a framework for evaluating the Syrian deception 
and thus provide insight into the ethical consideration likely to be inherent in deceiving 
civilians in war in general. These were then combined into five questions that are the 
foundation for evaluating the Syrian deception. This evaluation will also potentially 
provide truths that can elucidate considerations that will apply to other deceptions against 
civilians. 
• Is the deception necessary or could another method produce the same 
outcome? If the mission can be accomplished without deceiving civilians 
it should be unless there is a justifiable reason for why deception causes 
the least amount of harm. 
• Does the deception treat civilians as having a military value in a traditional 
sense or rely on force or coercion? 
• Is the intent to harm civilians? Deliberately seeking to harm civilians 
would immediately make the deception unethical. 
• Is any unintended harm proportionate to the likely good achieved?  
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• Is the desired outcome probable or even possible? Determine if an 
intended good outcome for the civilians is achievable, and have reasonable 
factors been considered to account for possible long-term harm from the 
deception. 
Taking what was determined in the previous sub-chapters will now be applied to 
answer these questions in order. Also, any considerations for how it would apply to 
deceiving civilians in war outside of the Syria case study will be examined as appropriate. 
Regardless of any ethical issues that arise in any one question, all will be examined to 
provide a comprehensive evaluation. 
When looking at whether it was necessary to deceive the civilians to achieve the 
mission, it has already been shown that it was most likely that it was not necessary. The 
SDF and U.S. military would likely have been successful in deceiving ISIS about where 
they would attack without specifically targeting civilians as a part of the operation. The 
coalition conducted more than enough deceptive actions to create a reasonable expectation 
that the SDF would be attacking Raqqa rather than any other location. Additionally, since 
many of those deception pieces would have been seen by civilians, it is entirely possible 
that they would have reacted the same way regardless, but without the moral issues that are 
now being evaluated. Due to the lack of necessity and the known harm, even if it was 
limited to the general degradation of trust inherent to lies, it was still unethical to deceive 
civilians in this situation. However, it is still important to try to determine if deceiving 
civilians might be necessary for other situations. While it is impossible to conceive every 
possible reason for deceiving civilians, the most probable would be a deception intended 
to incite a particular action or inaction unrelated to deceiving any other outside force. If 
such an action would only happen if the target audience was deceived, then by its nature 
the deception could be considered necessary. It does not mean that such a deception would 
thereby automatically be permissible, all things considered, only that it might not fail this 
inspection. 
    The Syrian deception does arguably treat civilians as if they have traditional 
military value. Because the ultimate goal was to fool ISIS, the fact that civilians were 
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utilized as a method to achieve that deception via also deceiving those civilians, the 
populace was explicitly linked to a military operation. This is a clear violation of the 
principle of NCI. In a different scenario, it is again easy to imagine a situation where the 
deception was not tied to a military objective and would not violate the first part of the 
question. It is less certain that any deception could avoid violating the second portion, 
whether a deception relies on force or coercion. Mayer’s arguments for any action that 
takes away a civilian’s free will and Bok’s assertion that lies do constitute force come into 
play here.88 A lie between two individuals impairs or even denies the deceived person’s 
ability to know the reality of the subject they have been lied to on. Any decision or action 
or taken based on the lie has been forced upon them by corrupting their data in the same 
way that a computer can only make correct decisions if fed correct information. The idea 
that garbage in leads to garbage out in such situations seems apt. While there is no reason 
to believe that a person with perfect knowledge would make good or healthy decisions, in 
such a scenario no outside entity can be blamed. It may be likely that in a real-world 
situation a  military commander that could save civilian lives through deception would fall 
back on a utilitarian view and do so but just because the deception created good ends does 
not prevent it from being wrong. Likewise, a deception against an adversary that expects 
to be the target of force could be justified with the same intent used to complete any ethical 
military operation and a low standard of good consequences. It is that expectation of not 
being targeted for the use of force that seems to make deceiving civilians immoral by the 
normative standards that support the principle of NCI. 
While the Syria case study has not fared well so far during this evaluation, the third 
question of whether harm to civilians was intended is one more likely to provide a positive 
result. Remembering that this is not yet an evaluation of actual harm done or good 
achieved, but only a look at the intent behind the deception. In this case, the immediate 
intent would be the goal of deceiving civilians so that their behavior assists in the deception 
of ISIS. The long-term intent was to aid in the removal of ISIS, including from the areas 
where they brutally controlled the populace such as Raqqa. While the leaflets dropped 
                                                 
 88 Mayer, “Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity....” 221–31; Bok, Lying, 18. 
44 
encouraged civilians to flee, if they had decided to stay in Raqqa but talked about the 
coming assault it could plausibly have been just as effective. However, it would take 
incredible naiveté to believe that if the deception were successful that civilians would not 
flee the city, possibly in great numbers. Such a migration could easily aid friendly forces 
by clogging up roads and removing supplies from Raqqa that would then be unavailable to 
ISIS. Why impossible to know, there is the very real possibility that even if not specifically 
intended, such migration was considered a desirable outcome. This demonstrates the 
danger in this question because while it may be easy to have good intentions, this is also 
an area where the actor undertaking the deception can easily be dishonest with themselves 
about what they want to happen and if deception is likely to lead to a harmful end that 
happens to be beneficial to the deceiver.  
This leads directly to the question of proportionality. Assuming all other 
investigations resulted in a judgment of the deception in Syria being ethical, it was not 
proportional. Regardless of intent, civilians becoming unnecessary refugees leaving Raqqa, 
potentially on the order of tens to hundreds of thousands, with all the documented horrors 
that go along with doing so is no way offset by the military gain. Even, disregarding the 
population of Manbij that was denied the opportunity to flee, the fight to take Manbij 
involved significantly fewer soldiers on both sides than the number of civilians impacted. 
However, this is another area where the deceiver is in danger of not weighing all lives as 
being equal and therefore harm to friendlies, enemies, and civilians as equal. That is not to 
say that deception against civilians could not be proportionate, but it is difficult if not 
impossible for a reasonable observer to label the Syria case study as proportionate. 
Deceiving ISIS and through that deception being able to remove them more quickly 
from power in Syria was a reasonably likely and certainly possible outcome. From a macro 
view then the final question is satisfied. If an estimated 25%, and potentially an even 
greater number, had fled the city and may never return then it does seem like a case of 
destroying the city to save it.89 While certainly, some portion of the population remained 
until liberations, for the portion that left, the idea of liberating them from the hardship of 
                                                 
 89 REACH Initiative. “Ar-Raqqa Crisis Overview.” 
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living under ISIS becomes moot if that hardship has been unnecessarily replaced with the 
hardship of being refugees that may never see their homes again. This is a case where the 
short-term benefits seem to have been overvalued while the potential long-term harm was 
undervalued and the reality of what achieving the good intent meant practically was 
possibly downplayed or ignored altogether.       
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Understandably, military commanders may not see the harm in using deception 
against civilians, preferring lies to physical violence. Quantifying harm from deception is 
undeniably more difficult than from the direct application of violence. Even in the 
application of physical force, the outcome is typically described by the military in numbers 
of civilians killed or injured, rarely looking into the non-physical harm that results from 
physical violence. However, Chapter IV presented how deception against civilians, even 
in its most benign form can cause harm in both physical and non-physical ways. The Syria 
case study in particular highlights a situation where the immediate benefits to the military 
campaign were easy to ascertain but the long-term harm was likely unidentifiable before 
the operation. Based on the completed analysis utilizing the framework questions 
developed in Chapter III, the Syria deception arguably failed all five evaluations. In this 
particular case, including civilians as targets of the deception was unethical from multiple 
perspectives. Granted that while Syria represents only one deception, it is characteristic of 
MILDEC in general and provides vital insights into how other deceptions would fair under 
similar scrutiny. Ultimately, this analysis is not about passing judgment on an event that 
has already transpired but providing a means for determining the morality of deceiving 
civilians in the future. 
With this approach then, there appear to be several points that future military 
commanders need to keep in mind when considering using deception against civilians. The 
Syria deception illustrates the dangers of only considering short-term benefits for the 
deceiver and not maintaining a moral equivalency between the deceiving military unit and 
civilians when weighing potential effects. Improved understanding here could foreseeably 
create a situation where a deception could pass the proportionality portion of the moral 
litmus tests involving proportionality, intent, and the possibility of success. It is even 
possible that if the desired end state were separate from any military objective that the 
requirement for civilians to not be treated as having a military value in the traditional sense 
could be met. However, the more a deception plan answers these framework questions 
satisfactorily the more it stands to wonder why the deception is necessary in the first place. 
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As seen, even the general degradation of trust that comes from being deceived can have 
long-lasting effects on the relationship between the civilians and the military organization 
within the IE. So a MILDEC that did not cause disproportionate harm to civilians compared 
to the good it caused them, did not treat them as having military value, and is likely to 
achieve the desired good outcome seems unlikely to be impactful enough to justify using 
deception in the first place. 
The hardest obstacle that has presented itself is the question of whether deception 
uses force or coercion. Accepting that deception can be justifiably be classified as using 
force/coercion because it puts the deceived individual in a position to make decisions that 
they would not have otherwise made, similar to if physical coercion was used to the same 
effect. This is a difficult position to counter as there are methods of behavior change that 
do not involve force or coercion such as PSYOP that relies on truth-based persuasion. For 
the same reasons that non-lethal weapons violate NCI, so does deception. It is difficult, if 
not impossible to think of an example where deception is not coercive, and still have the 
situation require the use of deception rather than other means for the good objective to be 
achieved. Because of this, deceiving civilians is likely to always have serious ethical issues, 
regardless of how careful a military planner is when crafting the deception. It is therefore 
this author’s recommendation that future military deceptions do not include civilians. 
Indeed, even in cases where a MILDEC does not target non-combatants, care must be taken 
to mitigate foreseen but unintended consequences as any deception have the potential to 
cause horrendous suffering for those tangentially affected.    
However, if for whatever reason a deception involving civilians or other non-
combatants is deemed necessary, following the five-question framework developed in 
Chapter III provides a method for understanding the ethical considerations involved and 
minimizing them if not outright mitigating them. The nature of having infinite possible 
deception situations makes it unrealistic to hold up any framework or litmus test to 
perfectly determine ethical status, this framework covers the important areas from multiple 
normative theories. This holistic approach is less likely to allow for a single normative 
theory such as utilitarianism to be abused to justify an immoral action. By forcing a military 
commander to evaluate areas such as intent that they might not otherwise consider, it can 
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be hoped that deception will not be used against civilians in the manner of the Syria case 
study again.   
Future research into the moral limits of how the U.S. military employs PSYOP and 
other information-related capabilities is recommended due to the increased focus of 
conducting warfare in the IE. While PSYOP and other information operations do not 
generally rely on deception, there is a gray area between treating non-combatants as having 
military value when a military force engages with them as a part of a military operation. 
Defining where that line might be and what constitutes what is and is not ethical 
engagement with civilians in the IE is certainly a worthwhile goal for ensuring future 
military activities remain ethically justified.                
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